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In this paper I argue that the Young Hegelian 
Protestant theologian Bruno Bauer was ‘radicalized’ by the 
events of 1840s Prussia, and that the personal experiences 
he endured during this period explain his transition from 
the orthodox Hegelian Christianity that he espoused during 
his student days at the University of Berlin, to the 
vitriolic atheism and criticism of the Prussian state which 
he spouted from 1842 until the dissolution of his radical 
band of Young Hegelian friends known as Die Freien.  
The events that had such profound effects on Bruno 
Bauer’s thought include his frustration with the 
reactionary policies of Frederick William IV, the new 
Prussian king who reigned from 1840 to 1861; his removal 
from and marginal position outside of official Prussian 
academic life; the availability of radical journals, 
newspapers, and publishers; and Bauer’s patronage of 
radical political clubs and salons as outlets for the 
expression of that radicalism.  
 Bauer’s career is historically significant for a 
number of reasons. First, it reveals the attitudes of 
intellectuals disaffected with the reactionary regime of 
Frederick William IV. It also demonstrates the political 
choices that early nineteenth-century German academics were 
 vi
forced to make — whether to support or to criticize the 
existing regime — and the consequences of those (in Bauer’s 
case, negative) choices on their careers and their lives. 
Bauer’s life and career is also significant in that it 
illuminates the relationship between theology and politics 




In traditional representations of the Young Hegelians, 
scholars have consistently portrayed this cadre of 
intellectuals as either reacting to Hegel and/or 
anticipating Marx. Precious little scholarship has been 
done to examine the Young Hegelians outside of this Hegel-
Marx context. To be sure, viewing the Young Hegelians in 
such a way is not inaccurate. But perhaps Jean Francois 
Lyotard’s assessment of our postmodern condition as one of 
a decline of the popularity of Marxism and the announcement 
of ‘incredulity toward metanarratives’, we may profitably 
turn our attention back to the Young Hegelians and explore 
the group in its own right. In doing so, we might consider 
the impact of Prussian events of the 1840s on the Young 
Hegelians’ ideas, providing new historical, social, and 
intellectual contexts for understanding their lives and 
careers, rather than viewing them as mere epigones of Hegel 
or flawed approximations of Marx. 
In this thesis, I argue that the Young Hegelian 
Protestant theologian Bruno Bauer was ‘radicalized’ by the 
events of 1840s Prussia, and that the personal experiences 
he endured during this period explain his transition from 
the orthodox Hegelian Christianity that he espoused during 
his student days at the University of Berlin to the 
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vitriolic atheism and criticism of the Prussian state which 
he spouted from 1842 until the dissolution of his radical 
band of Young Hegelian friends known as Die Freien.  
The events which had such profound effects on Bauer’s 
thought included his frustration with the reactionary 
policies of Frederick William IV — from whom Bauer had 
hoped for enlightened rule and leadership of a Prussian 
state that could overcome the regressive religious 
consciousness of orthodox Christianity — the new Prussian 
king who reigned from 1840 to 1861; Bauer’s removal from 
and marginal position outside of official Prussian academic 
life; the availability of radical journals, newspapers, and 
publishers; and Bauer’s patronage of radical political 
clubs and salons as outlets for the expression of that 
radicalism.  
Bauer’s career is historically significant for a 
number of reasons. First, it reveals the attitudes of 
intellectuals disaffected with the reactionary regime of 
Frederick William IV. It also demonstrates the political 
choices that early nineteenth-century German academics were 
forced to make — whether to support or to criticize the 
existing regime — and the consequences of those (in Bauer’s 
case, negative) choices on their careers and their lives. 
Bauer’s life and career is also significant in how it 
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illuminates the relationship between theology and politics 
in early nineteenth-century Prussia. 
 
Survey of Literature 
Secondary literature on the Young Hegelians is 
extensive. Secondary sources on Bruno Bauer in particular 
are less so. Most scholarship on the Young Hegelians shares 
a common motif — that of the Young Hegelians’ influence on 
the intellectual development of Marx. In conventional 
scholarship, the ideas of the Young Hegelians are 
considered significant only insofar as they assist in 
explaining Marx’s thought. Viewing the Young Hegelians in 
such a way also fails to take the historical context of 
those ideas into serious consideration. Their ideas are 
often considered philosophically — disembodied from the 
political, social, and theological events of the times.  
An example of such a disembodied view of Young 
Hegelian ideas is Sidney Hook’s 1936 From Hegel to Marx: 
Studies in the Intellectual Development of Karl Marx. Here, 
Hook surveys the ideas of the Young Hegelians (Bauer 
included) but only as a function of the intellectual 
development of Marx, as the title implies. Additionally, in 
Hook’s study, the ideas of the Young Hegelians are 
disembodied from contemporary political and social events, 
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and are given little historical context. They are thus 
represented as flawed approximations of Marx’s mature 
thought. 
William J. Brazill’s The Young Hegelians (1970), is 
one of the few texts to consider the Young Hegelians in 
their own right (outside the context of Marx). Brazill 
surveys the thought of the Young Hegelians, from David F. 
Strauss to Max Stirner, arguing that the defining 
characteristic of Young Hegelian philosophy is the 
reduction of God to man, the overcoming of Christianity for 
humanism.   
In his 1971 article in The Review of Politics, “The 
Radicalism of a Young Hegelian: Bruno Bauer”, Zvi Rosen 
argues that Bauer’s subjectivist turn may first be detected 
in his Die Religion des alten Testaments (1838). Rosen then 
traces the radicalization of Bauer’s subjectivism from 1838 
through his subsequent works. Zvi Rosen’s 1977 monograph 
Bruno Bauer and Karl Marx: The Influence of Bruno Bauer on 
Marx’s Thought is another study where Bauer is portrayed as 
a function of Marx’s intellectual development, though in 
Rosen’s text, Bauer’s influence on Marx is considered 
exclusively. Rosen argues that Bauer influenced Marx’s 
dissertation, his criticism of religion, and his concept of 
alienation.  
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David McLellan’s The Young Hegelians and Karl Marx 
(1978), is a renewed study of the relationship between 
Young Hegelian ideas and Marx, in the spirit of Sidney 
Hook, written to reveal Marx’s intellectual debts to the 
Young Hegelians. McLellan’s study is Hook historicized, and 
this historicization of the Young Hegelians’ ideas is where 
the merit of The Young Hegelians and Karl Marx lies, though 
McLellan’s work study still represents the Young Hegelians 
as flawed approximations of Marx’s mature thought. 
Hans-Martin Sass evaluates Bauer’s critical theory in 
his 1978 “Bruno Bauer’s Critical Theory” in The 
Philosophical Forum. Sass argues that Bauer’s criticism was 
directed not only at religion, but after 1841, to politics 
as well. Thus Sass locates the politicization of Bauer’s 
radicalism in 1841. According to Bauer, criticism could 
serve as the means of overcoming alienation, and criticism 
was necessary for the liberation of the individual subject 
from religion and the regressive state. 
John Edward Toews’ 1980 Hegelianism: The Path Toward 
Dialectical Humanism, 1805-1841, is by far the finest study 
yet written of the legacy of Hegel. It is a rich 
intellectual history of the evolution of Hegelian thought, 
from the Young Hegel’s speculative idealism to the Left 
Hegelians’ dialectical humanism, and the disintegration of 
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that school. It considers the Hegelians in their historical 
environment, and includes a fine chapter on Bauer’s 
‘reduction of absolute spirit to human self-consciousness.’ 
Harold Mah’s The End of Philosophy, the Origin of 
“Ideology”: Karl Marx and the Crisis of the Young Hegelians 
(1987), is an echo of Marx and Engels’ German Ideology, in 
that it argues that Marx’s predecessors (such and Bauer and 
the jurist Arnold Ruge) maintained a belief in the 
‘sovereignty’ and autonomy of philosophy, (that is, its 
independence from worldly concerns), whereas Marx 
recognized that philosophy must be the servant of worldly 
concerns and social reality. According to Mah, Marx’s 
originality, as well as the origin of the theory of 
ideology, may be located in Marx’s recognition that Bauer 
and Ruge’s insistence that social problems could be solved 
by a change in consciousness rather than a change in social 
reality was impossible. 
Robert J. Hellman’s Berlin — The Red Room and White 
Beer: The “Free” Hegelian Radicals in the 1840s (1990), is 
the only work to concentrate solely on the Berlin Young 
Hegelians — Die Freien. It does so with an eye to how the 
group’s membership in radical clubs and their contributions 
to radical journals and newspapers facilitated their 
extremism. 
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In his 1996 “Bruno Bauer’s Political Critique, 1840-
1841”, in The Owl of Minerva, Douglas Moggach argues that 
Bauer’s political criticism was inspired by his negative 
reaction to Hegel’s Philosophy of Right. Moggach locates 
the origins of Bauer’s contention that the individual, 
rather than then state, must serve as the vehicle for the 
development of self-consciousness, in the years 1840-1841. 
The most recent study of the Young Hegelians, Warren 
Breckman’s Marx, the Young Hegelians, and the Origins of 
Radical Social Theory: Dethroning the Self (1999), is a 
study of how political, social, and economic questions were 
related to theology in early nineteenth-century Prussia. 
Breckman argues that Marx’s critiques of liberalism and 
individualism might be better understood if this 
relationship is recognized. There is very little 
consideration of Bauer, but it does convincingly illuminate 
the connection between politics and theology in Vormärz 
Prussia, though with Marx as a model. Breckman argues that 
this relationship undermines the distinction scholars have 
traditionally drawn between the theological criticism of 
the Young Hegelians in the 1830s and the political 
criticism of the 1840s.  
As my study will reveal, whereas Breckman is correct 
in recognizing the relationship between politics and 
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theology in Vormärz Prussia, this does not necessarily 
entail a rejection of the traditional distinction between 
the ‘theological’ 1830s and ‘political’ 1840s. Against 
Breckman, I also argue that radicalism was politicized in 
the 1840s, as theological criticism became a function of 
political criticism (rather than vice versa, as it had been 
in the 1830s), thus underscoring the continuing 
relationship between theology and politics — but not 
undermining the distinction in Young Hegelian thought in 
the 1830s and 1840s. 
The original contribution to scholarship that this 
thesis makes is that it concentrates on Bauer’s 
radicalization and recognizes 1840 as the turning point in 
Bauer’s intellectual development, but sets this turning 
point within the context of other events in Bauer’s life, 
such as his reading of Strauss’s 1835 Das Leben Jesu, his 
lack of stable and sustainable income, his removal from the 
University of Bonn in 1842, and his patronage of radical 
clubs and contributions to radical journals. Such a 
comprehensive synthesis of the intellectual and social 
factors affecting Bauer’s development has been lacking in 
scholarship dealing with Bruno Bauer in particular and the 
Young Hegelians in general; I hope thereby to throw new 
light onto Bauer’s ideas in their historical context, and 
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most importantly, outside of the context of Marx’s 
intellectual development. Accordingly, Bauer is at the 
center of this narrative, and insofar as Marx makes an 
appearance, he is at the periphery. My hope is that German 
Intellectual History will distance itself from the belief 
that all pre-Marxian radical German philosophy and theology 
must be seen as a flawed approximation of, and inevitably 



























2. The Weak Tradition of Prussian Political Radicalism 
 up to the 1840s 
 
 Before going further in the essay, a few technical 
matters should be addressed. Whereas the precise meanings 
of political terms such as radical, liberal, and 
conservative can be ambiguous today, they were especially 
so in nineteenth-century Prussia. An essay that plans to 
employ concepts such as these must precisely define such 
terms. In this essay, I shall consistently be using the 
terms aristocracy, bureaucracy, ‘official’ Prussian 
political and academic culture, and radicalism. 
‘Conservative’ refers primarily to the landed gentry, or 
nobility, who sought to preserve their feudal privileges 
against reformers and constitutionalists. The Prussian 
nobility usually supported the king, both during the 
Napoleonic Wars (1806-1813/1814) to defend against the 
French threat, and during the restoration period 
(1814/1815) in defense of the king’s (and their own) power 
against that of popular nationalists agitating for national 
assemblies and constitutions — though the king and the 
nobility’s interests were not always identical.  
 I do make a distinction, though, between Prussian 
aristocratic conservatism, and ‘official’ Prussian 
political culture, i.e., the bureaucracy. A cleavage 
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existed between the interests and agendas of the Prussian 
aristocracy and bureaucracy from the 1780s until at least 
1840. The two groups were not only politically distinct, 
but the bureaucracy or ‘aristocracy of service’ usually 
held the landed gentry in contempt. One even detects the 
practice of bureaucratic exclusivism in official Prussian 
society, not only sharing ideas and interests in common, 
but frequently intermarrying and segregating themselves 
from other classes — including the nobility.1 The 
bureaucracy was generally (though not always) drawn from 
the ranks of the Prussian Mittelstand and was based on 
merit rather than birth. To be sure, some aristocrats had 
agitated for a constitution and representative assembly, 
but they had hoped for one that would preserve their noble 
privileges. That is, their interest in a constitution was 
purely self-serving. After regaining some of their 
privileges during the Prussian Restoration, little was 
heard from the aristocracy in the way of agitation for a 
constitution or representative bodies.2  
 None of these groups — the nobility, bureaucracy, or 
liberals — were monolithic in their ideas or their 
                                                        
1 John R. Gillis, “Aristocracy and Bureaucracy in Nineteenth-Century 
Prussia” Past and Present 41 (1968): 110. 
2 Matthew Levinger, Enlightened Nationalism: The Transformation of 
Prussian Political Culture, 1806-1848 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2000), 130-131. 
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interests. Indeed, internal divisions existed within each 
of these groups.3 Conservatives were not always nobles, and 
not all nobles were conservative in their ideology. One may 
find nobles who espoused progressive ideas (e.g., Freiherr 
vom Stein), liberals within the bureaucracy and 
universities (e.g. Karl von Altenstein), and even within 
the army (e.g., Neithardt von Gneisenau). Indeed, there was 
a duality to the Prussian bureaucracy prior to the 1840s. 
It included those bureaucrats who were fiercely loyal to 
the king, and those liberals left over from the reform era.4 
While one cannot naively claim that all pre-1848 Prussian 
bureaucrats were unwavering supporters of the state, 
liberalism, while it enjoyed some successes, remained for 
the most part subdued and marginalized.5 
The bureaucracy as a group, on the other hand, tended 
to defend the state and the monarchy in order to stabilize 
the authority of the state. It is this ‘official’ 
bureaucratic Prussian culture that reinforced, and was 
usually an expression of, the king’s power. By 1848, the 
landed aristocracy had lost much of its wealth and 
                                                        
3 Eric Dorn Brose, The Politics of Technological Change in Prussia: Out 
of the Shadow of Antiquity, 1809-1848 (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1983), 253. 
4 Jonathan Knudsen, “The Limits of Liberal Politics in Berlin, 1815-
1848,” in In Search of a Liberal Germany: Studies in the History of 
German Liberalism from 1789 to the Present, ed. Konrad H. Jarausch and 
Larry Eugene Jones (New York: Berg Publishers, 1990), 116. 
5 Ibid., 114. 
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practical power. Instead of the landed aristocracy, the 
bureaucracy became the class which gave its support to the 
king, maintaining the status quo. As defenders of the 
existing order, the bureaucracy was the group which came 
into most frequent contact with political dissidents. Even 
those bureaucrats who espoused progressive ideas, such as 
Freiherr vom Stein (1757-1831), accepted the state’s role 
as an “instrument for social change and moral progress”,6 
though by 1840 the bureaucracy was beginning to be viewed 
less as a body dedicated to the progressive development of 
the state, but rather as an “intrusive, high-handed, and 
paternalistic”7 instrument of repression. This explains, in 
part, the direction of Prussian political radicalism after 
1840, which will be elaborated in chapter five.  
To be sure, the nobility generally continued to defend 
the Prussian status quo (and their own feudal privileges), 
but as they regained power during the Restoration, and as 
their liberal opposition was driven underground by 
Frederick William III’s consolidation of power following 
the 1820 revolts, they tended to withdraw from the 
                                                        
6 James J. Sheehan, German History: 1780-1866 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1989), 297. 
7 David F. Lindenfeld, The Practical Imagination: The German Sciences of 
State in the Nineteenth Century (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1997), 143. 
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political sphere.8 The Revolutions of 1820 began as a 
Spanish mutiny and spread to Portugal and Italy. As a 
result of the revolts, King Ferdinand of Spain was forced 
to accept a constitution substantially limiting his power, 
and Frederick William III consolidated his power at home in 
response to an enthusiastic public reaction to the revolts. 
As a result, Prussia, Austria, and Russia (Great Britain 
and France declined) agreed to come to the aid of any 
European state threatened by a revolutionary change of 
government. 
 The dissidents whom the Prussian bureaucracy was 
enjoined to rein in in order to prevent threats to the 
social order included rowdy student fraternities, or 
Burschenschaften, and revolutionary intellectuals (often 
embittered over their institutional marginalization) who 
advocated the destruction of the state. Whereas the 
bureaucracy (from approximately the Restoration to the late 
1840s) may have viewed even the most politically innocuous 
groups as dangerous political dissidents, and attempted to 
suppress their activity, this does not imply that they were 
in fact radicals. Indeed, few agitators could be counted as 
bona fide radicals; even the most progressive reformers 
usually went no further than the espousing of 
                                                        
8 Levinger, Enlightened Nationalism, 238.  
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constitutional monarchy. Most reformers, like Kant, were 
less concerned with who ruled than how they ruled.9 These 
political commitments may be explained in a number of ways 
— especially by Prussian fear of Jacobinism, which had 
revealed itself in the republican Terror of the French 
Revolution.  
 In addition, according to Matthew Levinger, the 
Prussian concept of ‘enlightened nationalism’ served as a 
conceptual barrier to demanding the dissolution of the 
monarchy and the establishment of a popular republic. 
Enlightened nationalism was a hybrid political program (a 
combination of enlightened ideas and nationalism) espoused 
primarily by civil servants (i.e., bureaucrats) to create a 
rational (enlightened) society and political order and an 
internally harmonious civil society (nation) in order “to 
overcome the contradiction between popular and monarchical 
sovereignty.”10 This could be achieved by rationally 
demonstrating that the interests of the king/state and the 
interests of the populace were identical and harmonious. 
Society would then harmoniously progress along these lines, 
free of any destabilizing domestic strife. Therefore, 
genuine freedom could still be enjoyed by the subjects 
within a monarchy. This sentiment echoes the rejoinder of 
                                                        
9 Ibid., 35. 
10 Ibid., viii and 5. 
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Kant (forever an obedient subject) to “Argue as much as you 
will, and about what you will, only obey.”11 In Vormärz 
Prussia, there was room for political debate, but not 
outright disobedience. 
 One example of Prussian liberal reform within the 
confines of the monarchy is the Freiherr vom Stein and Karl 
August von Hardenberg (1750-1822) era of Prussian history. 
Stein served as Prussia’s minister of commerce from 1804 to 
January 1807, then chief minister from September 1807 to 
1808. Hardenberg served as foreign minister of Prussia from 
1804 to 1806 and as chancellor from 1810 to 1817. 
 During the first decade of the nineteenth century, in 
order to modernize Prussia and unite the Prussian people 
together against the French threat, Stein and Hardenberg 
agitated for greater popular liberties and meritocratic 
reform of the military.12 Serfdom was abolished, 
restrictions on the sale of land to non-nobles were lifted, 
taxes were made uniform, and some political liberties were 
extended to Jews. After Napoleon was defeated and Prussia 
was liberated in 1813, the reformers hoped to increase 
popular participation in the government and use the people 
as an ally against the nobility, who opposed these reform 
                                                        
11 Immanuel Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals and What is 
Enlightenment?, translated by Lewis White Beck (New Jersey: Prentice-
Hall, 1997), 89. 
12 Brose, The Politics of Technological Change, 252. 
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efforts13, but such hopes never came to fruition. Very few 
liberals held any sympathies for revolution or democracy.14 
 Indeed, Prussian liberal reformers of every stripe 
usually supported the preservation of the monarchy in some 
form. Though only an “umbrella movement” united by their 
oppositional tendencies, liberals generally hoped to 
abolish remaining feudal privileges, and establish a 
constitution and representative bodies, though they were 
not democrats.15 These progressives (of the pre-1848 era) 
usually did not advocate the abolition of the monarchy, but 
rather a reconciliation of democratic and monarchical 
principles.16   
 Following the Wars of Liberation, the liberals had 
hoped to increase popular participation in the government. 
To this end, Stein helped establish representative bodies 
in Prussian cities, but these did not extend to the 
national level.17 The passage of the repressive Six and Ten 
Articles in 1832 pushed liberals (not to mention outright 
radicals) a step back in their reform efforts, and the fact 
that the Articles roughly coincide with the 1834 Zollverein 
                                                        
13 Robert M. Berdahl, The Politics of the Prussian Nobility: The 
Development of a Conservative Ideology, 1770-1848 (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1988), 108-109. 
14 Sheehan, German History, 596. 
15 Blackbourn, The Long Nineteenth Century: A History of Germany, 1780-
1918 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 130-131. 
16 Levinger, Enlightened Nationalism, 192. 
17 James J. Sheehan, German Liberalism in the Nineteenth Century, 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), 9. 
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reveals that while political liberalism was being 
restricted by the monarchy, economic liberalization was 
moving forward.18 
 Radicalism, on the other hand, went far beyond the 
reformers’ calls for a constitution while still retaining 
the monarchy. (Most reformers were members of the 
bureaucracy anyway.) Radicals, though their numbers were 
few, included republicans, extreme critics of the state, 
anarchists, and those radical few who advocated the 
outright abolition of the monarchy, or complete destruction 
of the state. Those political radicals caught in the spirit 
of the French Revolution, such as J.G. Fichte, who earned 
an early reputation for radicalism for his Contribution to 
the Rectification of the Public's Judgment of the French 
Revolution (1793), usually drew cautiously back from 
radical politics as they witnessed Napoleon’s march into 
the Holy Roman Empire and subjugation of the German 
people.19 Even after the Revolution of 1848, few factions 
demanding the outright abolition of the Prussian monarchy 
existed.20 In the dearth of radicalism during the Vormärz, 
groups such as Die Freien filled this radical void. 
                                                        
18 Lindenfeld, The Practical Imagination, 89. 
19 Theodore Ziolkowski, German Romanticism and Its Institutions 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 241. 
20 Levinger, Enlightened Nationalism, 192. 
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 In addition to political radicals, theological 
radicals — atheists and other extreme critics of religion — 
were persecuted by the bureaucracy — often with greater 
zeal than political dissidents. Such persecution was common 
in a state such as Prussia where theology and politics were 
so enmeshed, and which rejected liberal institutions such 
as church-state separation. Indeed, Enlightenment 
luminaries such as Voltaire who were considered extremely 
dangerous by the authorities, were critics of Christianity 
rather than the state — Voltaire even composed a poem 
lauding the virtues of Louis XIV! Rousseau found himself in 
exile in 1762 not for his republican Social Contract, but 
rather Emile, in his famous section on the Savoyard Preist, 
which criticized conventional religion. Fichte was driven 
from the University of Jena in 1799 on charges of atheism, 
not republicanism.  
 Atheism, criticism of Christianity or the Christian 
state, and theological radicalism were all taken seriously 
by the Prussian authorities. Indeed, it may be said that 
Germany’s radical tradition was theological rather than 
political. That tradition of theological radicalism did not 
become politicized until the 1840s, unlike in France, where 
the tradition of Enlightenment criticism of religious 
authority spilled over into criticism of the French 
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monarchy in 1789. The tradition of German theological 
radicalism included the religious criticism of Kant’s Die 
Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft (1793), 
Lessing’s Die Erziehung des Menschengeschlechts (1779), and 
de Wette’s Beiträge zur Einleitung in das Alte Testament 
(1806-1807). While German political radicalism was cut off 
in 1789 as a result of the French Revolution, and continued 
to be suppressed throughout the Vormärz period, theological 
radicalism continued into the 1840s. 
 In the case of Bruno Bauer, theology and politics are 
inextricably linked. Like many members of Die Freien, Bauer 
was first and foremost a theological radical, a political 
radical only second. This is not to suggest that Bauer was 
a defender of the Prussian status quo, but he believed that 
the greatest threat to the development of individual self-
consciousness was traditional Christianity.  Bauer was a 
critic of the Prussian state to the extent that it 
abrogated its power to — and allowed itself to become an 
instrument of — the church. For Bauer, the state was not 
intrinsically corrupt, and could in fact serve as a vehicle 
for the development of self-consciousness (specters of 
Hegel), but when in practice it became an instrument of the 
church (such as during the reign of Frederick William IV) 
it no longer served such a progressive function. This 
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illustrates the importance of the relationship between the 
state, religion, and philosophy, in Bauer’s thought. Had 
Frederick William IV gone in a secularizing direction, 
instead of embracing Pietism, Bauer’s philosophy may not 
have been so radicalized. 
 This weak tradition of political radicalism and 
propensity for theological radicalism may be explained in 
part by the fact that there was no group in Germany 
disposed to carry the political argument forward. The 
German Enlightenment continues to hold a reputation for 
political inaction, and this tradition of inaction may have 
carried into the early nineteenth century. During the 
Enlightenment, those frustrated with Prussian politics had 
no one to appeal to. The intellectuals were the only 
educated class in Germany, but the state dominated 
employment possibilities for academics. Since so many 
German liberals were employed by the state, this restricted 
their inclination or ability to speak out and criticize 
state policies.21 German academics were not used to a world 
in which one could step outside of his civil service 
tradition to criticize the state. There was no middle 
class, and dissidents could not count on the Junkers to 
sympathize with them. As a result, there was a tendency to 
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trust in the enlightened despot Frederick the Great to do 
the right thing. Who but the state could help reform 
society anyway? Few social institutions existed that 
academics could appeal to besides the state. Opportunities 
for sustained German political radicalism simply did not 
exist. 
 Additionally, Leonard Krieger’s cliché of the ‘German 
Conception of Freedom’ serves to explain the weak tradition 
of political radicalism in Prussia. If freedom was indeed a 
function of the mind rather than social action for Germans, 
then this may help explain why radical criticism of the 
state did not appear in Germany before the 1840s. To the 
limited extent that it did, or to the extent that it 
expressed itself as moderate liberal reformism, it was 
usually quickly suppressed by the authorities. Prussia did 
however possess a strong tradition of theological 
radicalism, a legacy of the anti-clerical tradition of the 
Enlightenment. For reasons to be explained below, the 
conditions of possibility for German political radicalism 
largely were not satisfied until the 1840s. The effects of 
the government’s repression of who it perceived as 
political dissidents will also be considered below.  
 Neither liberalism nor radicalism then, were strong or 
sustainable political movements until the 1840s, but while 
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the conservative nobility, progressive reformers, and a 
handful of radicals, were all included in the composition 
of Vormärz Prussian political debate, until the 1840s, the 
official bureaucracy, as an appendage of the monarch, 






































3. The Effects of Political Repression Following the Wars 
of Liberation and in the 1830s — The Repressed Were Not 
Radicalized 
 
 In Vormärz Prussia, theological radicalism, and to the 
extent that is asserted itself, political radicalism, was 
met with the official repression of the government. The 
first wave of repression came in 1819 with the passage of 
the Karlsbad Decrees, passed when a young Burschenschaftler 
assassinated a conservative playwright. Following the 
Revolutions of 1820 and those of 1830, a new wave of 
oppressive laws were passed, most notably in the form of 
the Six and Ten Articles of 1832. These laws silenced 
liberal and radical opposition to the regime of Frederick 
William III, but those affected by these waves of 
repression were not usually radicalized — or at least kept 
their radicalism to themselves. 
 In order to better understand how the exclusion of 
Bauer from ‘official’ Prussian academic society served as a 
catalyst for his further radicalization, it is necessary to 
contrast the radical ideas of Die Freien to those of their 
bureaucratic and conservative adversaries in ‘official’ 
Prussian academics and politics. Accordingly, I shall now 
examine the ideological composition of the German 
universities from the Restoration to 1848, which roughly 
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corresponds to the activity of Bauer and the Berlin Young 
Hegelians.  
For the most part, the faculties and especially 
administrative bodies of German universities during this 
era were of a bureaucratic bent. As I have explained 
elsewhere in this essay, I believe ‘bureaucratic’ to be a 
more accurate description of ‘official’ Prussian society at 
this time than ‘conservative’, which immediately conjures 
images of the nobility and landed aristocracy. Again, 
bureaucratic here is meant to imply an ideological bent 
that includes loyalty to the state and its preservation, 
trust in appointed officials to make necessary reforms 
(e.g., Stein and Hardenberg’s ‘reform from above’), defense 
of the status quo, and a slightly liberal, but never 
radical worldview, rather than a defense of the landed, 
noble estate.  
It is this ‘bureaucratic’ sentiment that animated much 
of the German, and especially Prussian universities during 
the early to mid nineteenth century. To be sure, exceptions 
to this rule existed, but for the most part, German 
faculties and administrations displayed these bureaucratic, 
and never radical, proclivities. Dissident, opposition 
faculty members, to the limited extent that they held 
positions within the German universities, were for the most 
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part politically impotent, and their critiques had the 
effect of wounding merely “the vanity of kings and 
ministers, not their power.”22 
As James J. Sheehan states in his German History 1770-
1866,  
The nineteenth-century university was a state-run 
institution, staffed by civil servants, and ultimately 
controlled by a government ministry [where] 
bureaucratic influence was substantial.23 
 
In other words, the German university of this time was in 
large part simply an instrument of the state (bureaucracy). 
The Prussian monarchy relied upon the university and its 
bureaucratic administrators (and faculty) to lend prestige 
to the monarchy and state, maintain the status quo, train 
students for careers in civil service, and ‘police’ the 
university faculties for dissidents. Many of these 
administrators and faculty members actually espoused these 
bureaucratic sentiments, and were not simply lackeys of the 
monarchy — indeed, they were scholars. Especially after the 
revolutions of 1830, professors tended to proclaim their 
loyalty to the Prussian monarchy and their opposition to 
radical change. If they did agitate for reform, it was 
reform of a moderate or token variety only.24 Like so many 
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other Prussian citizens, even the most extreme members of 
the German universities remained loyal monarchists, hardly 
ever agitating for republicanism.  
The reasons for such bureaucratic proclivities of the 
university faculties and administrators are as follows: 
With the Terror of the French Revolution obviously still 
lingering in their minds, educators and other civil 
servants were sincerely troubled by the threat of 
revolution and the violent overthrow of the state.25 This 
fear of a possible revolution animated the ideas of many 
bureaucrats, but other more practical explanations also 
exist for their ideological tendencies. For instance, the 
German university served as a preparatory institution for 
civil servants. In order to become a Prussian civil 
servant, an applicant was required to pass a civil service 
exam which the university prepared its students to take. It 
is only natural that the state would take an interest in 
the university as it served this capacity, and that a 
training institution for future bureaucrats would be 
dominated by those sympathetic to a bureaucratic ideology. 
As John Edward Toews points out,  
                                                        
25 Levinger, Enlightened Nationalism, 180. 
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The universities were state-controlled institutions, 
staffed by civil servants, whose main function was the 
recruitment and training of the state-service class.26 
 
The German university operated according to bureaucratic 
interests and also prepared students enrolled for a life of 
bureaucratic service. As this cycle continued, the 
professorate began to identify itself more and more with 
the state administration and bureaucracy, and undertook the 
defense and lionization of the state.  
 Finally, during the 1830s and 1840s the job market for 
civil servants become saturated as more students graduated 
from university and sought positions in the bureaucracy 
that were already filled. During the first half of the 
nineteenth century in Prussia, there were approximately 
120-150 clerical vacancies a year, and approximately 30 
tenured positions in theology faculties at the six Prussian 
universities. Even with this dearth of secure employment 
prospects for theology students, approximately 1600 
theology students per year were enrolled in Prussian 
universities.27 This explains in part why so many civil 
servants (university professors included) were so eager to 
defend the state and the status quo. In defending the 
                                                        
26 John Edward Toews, Hegelianism: The Path toward Dialectical Humanism, 
1805-1841 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 15. 
27 Harold Mah, The End of Philosophy, the Origin of “Ideology”: Karl 
Marx and the Crisis of the Young Hegelians (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1987), 53. 
 29
state, they were by extension defending their own 
occupations. This fervent competition for available 
positions in the civil service and universities was coupled 
with the imposition of ideological criteria in hiring.28 
These imposed ideological criteria served to insure that 
the existing and future members of the university faculties 
and bureaucracy would toe the bureaucratic line.  
The overflow of the job market had another 
significant, albeit surely unintended effect on the 
students who were turned away from bureaucratic positions. 
Having no prospects for work in the professions that their 
university education had trained them for, some graduates 
became alienated from the state and ‘official’ Prussian 
society. As we shall see, some of these alienated and 
disgruntled graduates with few job prospects would vent 
their frustration in ways that had significant results for 
the intellectual history of Germany. The unemployment 
crisis and lack of jobs in the official sector contributed 
to a climate of discontent. It is likely that the 
bureaucracy became more diligent in its work of policing 
dissident behavior in order to protect their jobs, and 
those graduates who were turned away from civic employment 
were embittered and no doubt more receptive to ideas which 
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were critical of the government. This climate of discontent 
and unease — a climate perfectly suited for the emergence 
of radical groups — was the one in which Die Freien formed. 
Lenore O’Boyle has noted that this ‘intellectual 
proletariat’ of unemployed, disaffected, intellectuals 
played an important role in the revolutions of 1830 and 
1848.29 
The Karlsbad Decrees of 1819 serve as an example of 
state intervention in higher education and an attempt to 
rein in dissidents (within academia and the German states 
as a whole), and preserve the Metternichian social order. 
The decrees were measures passed in 1819 by a diet of the 
German Confederation (on the advice of Metternich) which 
established stricter standards of censorship and instituted 
surveillance of and control over the universities — both 
faculty ‘renegades’ and student agitators. They applied to 
the German Confederation as a whole, and dictated, in part, 
that: 
The governments of the federal states are bound to 
each other, to remove from the universities and other 
institutions of learning, those university and other 
public educators, who by demonstrable deviation from 
their duties, or by overstepping the boundaries of 
their profession, abuse their rightful influences on 
the disposition of the youth, through the 
dissemination of pernicious teachings which are 
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hostile to the public order and peace, and undermine 
the foundation of existing state mechanisms . . . A 
teacher thus banned may not again be employed in an 
institution of public learning or any other federal 
state.30 
 
 The decrees were passed with the memory of the Terror 
of the French Revolution still burning in the minds of 
German bureaucrats. The main catalyst for their 
promulgation was the assassination of the reactionary 
playwright August von Kotzebue by a young burschenschafter 
(member of a liberal student organization) and theology 
student, Karl Ludwig Sand. The assassination was considered 
proof of a growing revolutionary threat, and the German 
monarchies took what they considered to be appropriate 
measures to suppress it. This perceived threat of 
revolution was one of the primary reasons that even the 
most progressive German reformers remained constitutional 
monarchists, wary of venturing into republican politics. 
 The assassination of Kotzebue was the direct cause of 
the removal of two distinguished Prussian academics from 
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their positions. Wilhelm de Wette, a theology professor at 
Berlin, sent a consoling letter to the mother of the 
assassin, Karl Ludwig Sand. In it de Wette consoled Sand’s 
mother, lauding her son, and glorifying his actions. After 
a copy of de Wette’s letter fell into the hands of the 
Prussian police ministry, and was reviewed by the 
authorities, Frederick William III had de Wette summarily 
removed from his position at Berlin.31  
 A similar fate befell Friedrich Wilhelm Carove, a 
philosopher, and at the time of Kotzebue’s assassination, 
Hegel’s assistant at Berlin. After the assassination, 
Carove produced a highly ambiguous pamphlet that seemingly 
defended the actions of Sand. He argued that his pamphlet 
was not a defense of Sand, and that that interpretation 
arose only from the tract’s ambiguity. Eventually, the 
authorities accepted his explanation, but nevertheless, he 
was prohibited from holding any academic positions in 
Germany.32 In addition to de Wette and Carove, one of the 
founders of the University of Berlin, Wilhelm von Humboldt, 
left his office in the Prussian government as Minister of 
Education in 1819, because of his opposition to the 
Karlsbad Decrees. 
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 The Karlsbad Decrees remained in effect, with 
occasional periods of relaxation in the early 1840s with 
the ascension of Frederick William IV to the Prussian 
throne, until 1848. The bureaucrats within the university 
system (both faculty and administration) often served as 
‘enforcers’ of these decrees, monitoring and reporting on 
their heretical colleagues.33 After the passage of the 
Karlsbad Decrees, state intervention in the universities 
took not only the form of censorship and policing of 
‘subversion’, but also that of stricter regulations 
concerning entrance, curriculum, examinations, and 
other matters previously left largely to the 
universities.34 
 
The state and its bureaucracy now had control over the 
universities and what could be said or published there. The 
universities thus became manifestations and agents of the 
growing bureaucratizing tendency in official Prussian 
politics. The bureaucracy, now more than ever, had the 
power to remove dissidents from academic positions, and did 
so.  
 Yet another threat the Prussian bureaucracy moved 
swiftly to mitigate was that of German nationalism. During 
the Wars of Liberation, popular nationalism was tapped by 
the state as a source of defense and German unity against 
the French occupiers. However, in the aftermath of the Wars 
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of Liberation, nationalist organizations (such as the 
Burschenschaften) turned against the state, claiming that 
the Volk owed its allegiance not to the king, but rather to 
the German nation. The Prussian bureaucracy felt threatened 
by the remnants of German nationalism left over from the 
Wars of Liberation, and during the restoration acted 
accordingly to eliminate that threat. 
The generation after 1819 witnessed a renewed 
crackdown and a reinforcement of censorship following the 
Revolutions of 1830, which fed “reactionary fears and 
liberal hopes”35, as well at the 1832 Hambach Festival in 
Germany, where progressives agitated for freedoms of 
expression, the press, and assembly. Again, fear of 
radicalism compelled the Frankfurt Diet (again orchestrated 
by Metternich) to issue the ‘Six Articles’ and ‘Ten 
Articles’ in 1832. These documents reintroduced strict 
censorship and surveillance of Prussian academic and 
political life.36 In June 1833 additional measures were 
taken to quash subversive activity, as the German 
Confederation established the Central Bureau of Political 
Investigation to police dissident groups, though state 
attempts at suppression were only partially successful.37 As 
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will be described below, during both periods of heightened 
censorship and surveillance, professors and statesmen were 
removed from their positions on the basis of the Karlsbad 
Decrees of 1819 and the Six and Ten Articles of 1832. 
Following the renewed crackdown on political agitators 
after the passage of the Six and Ten Articles, a new wave 
of exclusion occurred, the most famous being the case of 
the ‘Göttingen Seven’. Seven professors from the University 
of Göttingen refused to take an oath to the new king of 
Hanover, Ernst August, because the king had dissolved the 
constitution of 1833. These seven included, among others, 
the historians Gervinus and Dahlmann, and the brothers 
Jacob and Wilhelm Grimm. In 1837 these seven men were 
summarily removed from their positions, and three were 
forced into exile.38 
In yet another example of government repression, in 
1835 the literary school Junges Deutschland (Young 
Germany), a literary-political group dedicated to liberal 
reforms, found the books of its members banned outright in 
Prussia by Frederick William III for perceived threats 
Young Germany posed to the social order. 
 Despite their exclusions from political life, figures 
such as Wilhelm von Humboldt were usually not radicalized 
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by their experiences. During the 1830s political opposition 
in Germany may have been growing, but it was not yet 
radicalized, and it was still compelled to express itself 
indirectly.39 Indeed, Dahlmann was recalled into public 
service in 1842 at the University of Bonn by Frederick 
William IV’s culture minister J.A.F. Eichhorn (1779-1856). 
This coincides with the early period of the king’s reign 
where he attempted to make amends with and liberal 
concessions to discontented Prussian academics. Yet this 
conciliatory period lasted no longer than two years.  
 These intellectuals’ experience of repression did not 
push them to the fringe of German political discourse, nor 
did it embitter them. Humboldt’s criticism of the Karlsbad 
Decrees, and the Göttingen Seven’s refusal to take the oath 
to Ernest August may have been irreverent, but certainly 
not revolutionary. After leaving government, Humboldt 
devoted the rest of his life to his scholarship, not to 
radical politics. Bruno Bauer however, would chart a 
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4. Bruno Bauer’s Experience of Repression, or, The 
 Radicalization of Bruno Bauer 
 
Bruno Bauer was born on September 9, 1809 to Friedrich 
Wilhelm Bauer, a porcelain painter. Bruno was born in 
Eisleben in Saxony, the oldest of four brothers. The family 
moved to Berlin in 1815, where Bruno and his brother Edgar 
(both of whom would later become associated with Die 
Freien) matriculated into Friedrich Wilhelm Gymnasium in 
Berlin. Here Bruno began his study of theology. In 1828 he 
entered the University of Berlin to pursue his theological 
studies further, attending lectures by Schleiermacher 
(1768-1834), the Hegelian theologian Philip K. Marheineke 
(1780-1846) — whom he esteemed second only to Hegel —  the 
Pietist theologian and biblical scholar August Neander 
(1789-1850), and Hegel himself. In 1829 he won an essay 
contest on the subject of Kant’s conception of aesthetic 
beauty. The topic was proposed by Hegel himself, and Bauer 
won praise from the philosopher for his winning essay. In 
1834 Bauer passed his exams without difficulty and received 
his unconditional certificate to teach (Licentia Docendi).40 
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Bauer was an exceptional student at Berlin, 
collaborating with Marheineke in editing Hegel’s Lectures 
on the Philosophy of Religion for publication. His early 
status as a staunch supporter of orthodox Hegelianism was 
widely known, so much so that Schleiermacher felt 
personally slighted and prevented Bauer from becoming a 
Dozent until the former’s death in 1834.41 From 1834 to 1839 
Bauer taught at the University of Berlin, and contributed 
reviews to the Jahrbücher für wissenschaftliche Kritik, a 
major organ of orthodox Hegelianism. In 1836 Bauer met Karl 
Marx, at that time a student attending Bauer’s lectures. In 
the same year, Bauer established a journal, the Zeitschrift 
für spekulative Theology, to which he contributed articles 
which revealed his early position as an orthodox Hegelian 
and Christian.42  
The world into which Bruno Bauer came of age was one 
in which, following Hegel’s death in 1831, the most 
dominant faction of Hegelian supporters were the so-called 
Right Hegelians. The Right Hegelians were theologically 
orthodox, and wished to reconcile Hegel’s Absolute Idealism 
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with Christianity. Politically, they supported the 
authority of the Prussian state and served it loyally.43  
Soon, a group of vocal young philosophers would come 
to challenge the conservative interpretations of Hegel. The 
distinction between Young (Left) Hegelianism and Old 
(Right) Hegelianism was not made until 1837, but the 
movement was inaugurated in 1835 in debates over David F. 
Strauss’s Das Leben Jesu. 
In time, a Young Hegelian school began to emerge, 
whose primary interest was the theological implications of 
Hegel’s philosophy. Centered in Berlin, the Young Hegelians 
wished to purge Hegelian philosophy of what they considered 
its idealism and supernaturalism, and sought to replace the 
Hegelian Absolute Spirit, or God, with man. In this way the 
Young Hegelians made man the object of history rather than 
God. The Young Hegelians were more humanists than 
Christians, representing the secularization or humanization 
of Hegelianism. The intellectual environment of the mid to 
late 1830s, with its competing factions of Hegelian 
sympathizers, along with their opponents, including the 
theologian Friedrich Schleiermacher and his devotees, was 
the one in which Bauer began his career. 
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 In 1835 David F. Strauss’s Das Leben Jesu appeared and 
set the world of theology on its ear by suggesting that the 
gospels were nothing more than the expressions of myths 
collectively held by early Christian and messianic Jewish 
communities. Strauss’s suggestion that Christianity was 
mythical in character especially troubled orthodox Hegelian 
theologians, who followed Hegel in believing that 
Christianity was a less refined or less developed form of 
philosophy. It was Strauss’s contention that Christianity 
was mythical rather than rational, which challenged the 
orthodox Hegelian position that Christianity shared the 
same form (albeit less ‘advanced’), if not content, of 
philosophy. Upon the publication of Das Leben Jesu and the 
ensuing controversy, Strauss was removed by authorities 
from his position as professor of theology at Tübingen. In 
1839 he was offered a chair of theology at the University 
of Zürich, but the offer was withdrawn following the public 
outcry which the offer caused in the city.44 
 Strauss’s Das Leben Jesu had more than intellectual 
implications; it had social and political consequences as 
well. The controversy resulting from the reception of 
Strauss’s Das Leben Jesu led Frederick William III to 
conclude that criticism of religion could lead to criticism 
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of other forms of authority — such as state authority. 
Accordingly, the king took action against potentially 
subversive political organizations, such as the reform 
group Young Germany. Young Germany was condemned by the 
Prussian government and banned in 1835 for their alleged 
assaults on the Christian religion and the threat to 
authority which such assaults presumably implied.45 
 Impressed by his intellectual precociousness and 
orthodox Hegelian bona fides, the editorial board of the 
Jahrbücher für wissenschaftliche Kritik chose Bruno Bauer 
to represent the orthodox Hegelian position and to refute 
Strauss’s argument.46 The young Bauer’s critique of Das 
Leben Jesu won him immediate acclaim throughout Germany, 
and increased his status even more among the conservative 
Hegelians.47 But as Bauer developed his answer to Strauss, 
the germ of what would become the basis of his later, more 
radical theology was revealed. In a series of source-
critical works from 1838 to 1840, which addressed the 
religious experience of the Old Testament Jews and the 
authorship of the gospels, Bauer articulated the idea that 
the gospels were but expressions of individual self-
consciousness. Whereas Strauss had argued that the gospels 
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were expressions of the (communally held) myths and 
messianic expectations of the early Christian communities, 
Bauer argued that the gospels were strictly products of the 
self-consciousnesses of their respective authors, thus 
underscoring the individual, subjective character of the 
gospels. Bauer’s position concerning the authorship of the 
Gospels not only contradicted Strauss’s mythical 
interpretation, but was also in stark contrast to the 
orthodox Hegelian position that the gospels were 
expressions of the Absolute revealed to individual 
consciousness.48 This theme of the primacy of the individual 
consciousness would become a leitmotif throughout the later 
work of Bauer, and would animate his later extreme 
individualism.  
 Among Bauer’s works in this era was the two-volume Die 
Religion des alten Testaments in der geschichtlichen 
Entwicklung ihrer Prinzipien dargestellt (1838), in which 
Bauer applied his subjectivist ideas to Judaism. Here, he 
argued that the Jewish religion stressed the ‘otherness’ of 
God and man, implying that God was distinct and apart from 
man. According to Bauer, Christianity repudiated this 
otherness of God in the person of Jesus, whose dual nature 
revealed that man and the divine were in fact one. Thus, 
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Christianity represented a higher level of consciousness 
than Judaism because it rejected the externality of the 
deity. Die Religion des alten Testaments also stressed the 
subjective element of religious experience, and in it we 
may detect the subjectivist direction that Bauer’s writings 
had taken since his reading of Strauss — that religious 
experience was merely a product of self-consciousness.  
 If Bauer’s apostasy began with his reading of Strauss, 
his experience in the university system of the later 1830s 
and early 1840s shaped his later career as a theological 
radical. In 1839, Bauer was offered a position on the 
theology faculty at Bonn.  The pro-Hegelian Minister of 
Culture Karl von Altenstein (1770-1840) was instrumental in 
securing the position for Bauer, whose appointment to the 
post was opposed by Schleiermacher’s supporters on the 
faculty. Altenstein was the highest ranking ally of 
Hegelians (Old and Young) in ‘official’ Prussian political 
culture. Bonn was a more conservative institution than 
Berlin, but free of the climate of orthodox Hegeliansim 
which permeated the University of Berlin, Bauer was able to 
develop his increasingly unorthodox ideas further, and here 
his literary output reached its zenith.49 Only a 
privatdozent during his time at Bonn, Bauer was forced to 
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survive on only student fees and a small fellowship 
(privatdozents were not salaried). He unceasingly 
complained to his colleagues about his dire financial 
straits. 
 In 1839 Bauer began to drift away from the orthodox 
Hegelianism of his youth. These included a pamphlet 
bitterly critical of the orthodox Hegelian theologian E.W. 
Hengstenberg which appeared in 1839 while Bauer was still 
at Berlin. It was one of Bauer’s earliest displays of 
unorthodox opinion, facilitating his transfer to Bonn. It 
represented to one scholar of Bauer’s life “the beginning 
of the end of Bauer’s academic career.”50 While still in 
Berlin, Bauer began to frequent the Doktorklub, a group 
dedicated to the discussion of Young Hegelian ideas. The 
Doktorklub would eventually form the basis for the more 
radical Die Freien. In just three years Bauer would assume 
the informal leadership of the radical Free, and earn the 
epithet ‘Robespierre of Theology’, but in 1839, Bauer was 
not yet fully converted to Left Hegelianism.51 Indeed, 
Arnold Ruge (1802-1880), radical agitator and editor of a 
series of Young Hegelian journals, wrote him off as an Old 
Hegelian reactionary as late as October 1839. Ironically, 
Bauer, the ‘Old Hegelian reactionary’ of whom Ruge spoke, 
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would cost Ruge’s Hallische Jahrbücher the patronage of 
D.F. Strauss, and later, its very existence.52 During this 
time Bauer remained in limbo between Old and Young 
Hegelianism, though his increasing emphasis on the place of 
the subject in his theology, and political and social 
events to come, would help to ‘push’ him into the radical 
camp. 
 In 1840 Bauer completed the books Kritik der 
evangelischen Geschichte des Johannes and Die evangelische 
Landeskirche Preussens und die Wissenschaft.  The first 
suggested that “the gospel of John was a work of artistic 
creation. . . whose author used Jesus to express his 
particular point of view” and which lacked historical 
veracity.53 Bauer would soon arrive at a similar conclusion 
concerning the veracity of the synoptic gospels. A copy of 
this text arrived at the ministry of education, and by it 
new culture minister Eichhorn became convinced that Bauer 
and his ideas were a threat to Christian beliefs.54  
 The second was an essay in which Bauer expressed his 
hope for bureaucratic reforms from the new king. This hope 
reflected the liberal expectations shared by many 
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intellectuals in 1840. In the text, Bauer argued that the 
Prussian state should not subordinate itself to the church 
— a church which Bauer saw in resurgence. In his Die 
evangelische Landeskirche Preussens und die Wissenschaft, 
Bauer expressed his belief that Prussia was in grave danger 
as a result of a renewed religious consciousness spreading 
across the nation.55 Although Bauer evidently continued for 
some time to hope that Frederick’s liberalism would trump 
his commitment to Pietism and orthodox religious practices, 
already by early 1840, he was beginning to feel 
marginalized. In a March 1840 letter to his brother Edgar, 
Bruno prophesizes his eventual exclusion from academic 
life: 
 The day will come, when I will stand resolutely 
 against the entire  theological world. Only then, so I 
 believe, will I be in my right place, to which I  have 
 been persistently impelled by pressures and  struggles 
 during the past six years.56 
 
Perceiving his own radicalization as an inexorable process, 
Bauer could by now see the handwriting on the wall. Bauer 
was in fact officially notified of the revocation of his 
license to teach in March 1842, but was probably aware that 
as early as 1840 that his days at Bonn were numbered. 
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Indeed, it may be said that Bauer’s awareness of his 
impending exclusion, rather than the official act itself, 
further provoked him, and that his further radicalization 
dates from the earlier (1840), rather than later (March 
1842) date.57 
 Already disliked by many of his colleagues at Bonn, 
Bauer’s situation became even more precarious when 
Altenstein died in May 1840 and Frederick William IV, who 
would become a constant foil to Bauer, took the Prussian 
throne in June of the same year. Frederick was a Romantic, 
and a Pietistic, sincere Christian who took his role as 
‘leader’ of the unified Prussian church (1817) seriously. 
He was also a monarch for whom aesthetic, ideological, and 
especially religious concerns took precedence over the 
practice of realpolitik.58 With the ascendance of Frederick 
William IV came a resurgence of Pietism. Pietists 
emphasized the role of feeling in religious practice, 
believed in a literal interpretation of the Bible, and 
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rejected the speculative theological interpretations of 
rationalists and Hegelians.  
 Frederick appointed J.A.F. Eichhorn his Minister of 
Culture. Eichhorn was a lifetime civil servant who had 
enjoyed career success with the passage of the Zollverein 
and was a redoubtable anti-Hegelian, but unlike his 
predecessor Altenstein, a man without liberals sympathies.59 
But at least initially, Bauer was able to consider working 
with him. 
 Bauer appealed to Eichhorn in October 1840 for a 
promotion to associate professor — a position which would 
have provided a steady income and security. In exchange for 
this promotion, Bauer went so far as to promise to restrain 
his provocative Young Hegelian ideas. Eichhorn refused 
Bauer’s request, which no doubt left him desperate, and 
ended his willingness to meet the government halfway60 Proof 
of the bitterness Bauer felt over this rejection is that in 
a short time after the episode, we find Bauer resolute in 
his decision to provoke the government to a confrontation — 
a confrontation that would eventually lead to Bauer’s 
removal from Bonn, and embitter him further. 
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 As we have seen, Bauer was already anxious about the 
resurgence of Pietism even before the ascendance of 
Frederick to the throne in June 1840. Frederick’s policies 
upon taking the throne, which lent themselves to the 
resurgence of Pietism, confirmed Bauer’s anxieties as 
expressed in Die evangelische Landeskirche and further 
alienated him from the state and its policies. In 1841 
Friedrich Schelling was called to Berlin by the king 
himself to exterminate “the dragon-seed of Hegelianism,”61 
and it was clear that subversive thinkers like Bauer would 
not enjoy the relative academic freedom afforded them by 
the only sporadic enforcement of censorship laws under 
Frederick William III and his Hegelian-friendly minister 
Altenstein. The new king also rejected demands for an even 
moderately liberal constitution. In addition to calling 
Schelling to Berlin, the conservative historian Friedrich 
Julius Stahl (as well as other Romantic, Pietist 
intellectuals) was appointed to a chair in History. Stahl 
dutifully took up Frederick William IV and Eichhorn’s 
program of religious restoration in the service of the 
Prussian state.62  
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 One such text in which Stahl expressed his support for 
the new king’s policies was his 1840 Die Kirchenverfassung 
nach Lehre und Recht der Protestanten. Stahl had argued 
that “in relation to the Church, [the state’s] power [was] 
only a means for upholding the orthodox order.”63  Stahl’s 
conception of the state as a defender of the official 
religious order was manifest in the policies of Frederick 
William IV.   
 The period from 1840, when Frederick William IV took 
the throne, to the suppression of the radical press in 
1842-1843, was the time when the Young Hegelians were at 
their greatest strength.64 These years also coincide with 
the most radical period of Bauer’s career. 1841 could have 
held little more appeal to Bauer than the previous year, 
for in May of 1841 his only friend and supporter on the 
Bonn theology faculty, Johann Augusti, died.65 This 
combination of factors of 1840 and 1841 must certainly have 
provoked Bauer to further desperation. This desperation is 
reflected in his post-1840/1841 works. In these studies, 
one may detect a consistent theme to Bauer’s theology: that 
instead of the Bible being a record of God’s coming to 
self-consciousness, it represented nothing more than a 
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record of the development of human consciousness. God was 
nothing more than a creation of the human imagination.66 The 
reduction of God to man, from theology to anthropology, is 
a characteristic Young Hegelian idea.  
 Another event which certainly influenced Bauer’s 
intellectual development was the 1841 publication of Ludwig 
Feuerbach’s Das Wesen des Christentums. Feuerbach had been 
removed from his position at the University of Erlangen 
earlier in his career (1838) for denying personal 
immortality. Feuerbach’s dismissal was a fate that would 
befall nearly all theological radicals in Germany.67 Like 
Bruno Bauer, Feuerbach argued that religion alienated 
humanity from itself, for the religious consciousness 
attributed to God what it lacked itself.68 Bauer’s reaction 
to Feuerbach’s argument that God was simply a projection of 
man’s highest values onto the transcendent was negative, as 
was his first reaction to Strauss. Whereas Feuerbach 
suggested that God represented an outward projection of 
human values, and thus alienated man from himself and those 
values, Bauer bitterly argued that the idea of God was an 
act of pure invention, a projection of in-human values. 
Presaging Nietzsche’s more acerbic later work, Bauer 
                                                        
66 Ibid., 61. 
67 Brazill, The Young Hegelians, 140. 
68 Zvi Rosen, “The Radicalism of a Young Hegelian: Bruno Bauer” The 
Review of Politics, Vol. 33, No. 3 (July 1971): 392. 
 52
claimed that God and Christian values were an un-natural 
reflection of the subject’s inherently free nature and a 
denial of this world for the transcendental. Bauer writes:  
 Religion . . . is a loathing for the world itself, a 
 despair over history, a denial of the world itself and 
 nothing other than that.69 
 
Additionally, whereas Feuerbach argued that traditional 
religion should be replaced with a universalist humanism, 
Bauer maintained his subjectivist bent and continued to 
emphasize the importance of individual self-consciousness 
rather than universal humanity. The origins of religion and 
Christianity were a socio-cultural phenomenon, but the 
overcoming of the alienation caused by religion was to be a 
subjective enterprise. 
 In his June 1841 article “Der christliche Staat und 
unsere Zeit”, in Arnold Ruge’s Young Hegelian journal 
Hallische Jahrbücher, Bauer rebuked Friedrich Julius 
Stahl’s characterization of the state as an instrument of 
the church. In this article, Bauer reacted as much to 
Stahl’s text as to the new royal policies which it 
supported. Bauer’s rebuke to Strauss’s conception of the 
Gospels as communally held myths was to suggest instead 
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that they were products of individual self-consciousness. 
Such a rebuke was Bauer’s estimation of the role of 
subjectivity in the production of the Gospels. In Bauer’s 
rebuke to Stahl, his Die evangelische Landeskirche, he 
highlighted the connection between his theological and 
political views, applying his ideas of the paramount 
importance of self-consciousness to politics. Increasingly, 
Bauer viewed the policies of Frederick William IV as an 
historical regression, an impediment to an already 
transcended stage in the dialectic of history. 
Increasingly, Bauer found it necessary to use radical 
weapons to do battle with these regressive policies.  
 In October 1841 Bauer produced Die Posaune des 
jungsten Gerichts uber Hegel den Atheisten und 
Antichristen: Ein Ultimatum, which, in assuming the guise 
of an orthodox Pietist, ironically argued — against the 
Right and Center Hegelians’ interpretations of Hegel which 
had wrongly claimed that Hegel’s philosophy was compatible 
with orthodox Christianity and political conservatism — 
that Hegel’s philosophy had atheistic and revolutionary 
implications, including the overthrow of the church and 
state, which had been concealed by Hegel’s conservative 
epigones. In writing Die Posaune, Bauer hoped to clearly 
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define the lines of contention between Old and Young 
Hegelians.70 
 As a result of Frederick’s accession to the throne, 
Bauer began to drift even further from official Prussian 
state policy. An example of Bauer’s distaste for 
Frederick’s regime was his participation in the December 
1841 tribute to the liberal jurist Karl Welcker. This 
tribute vexed the king enough for him to demand an 
investigation of Bauer, and thus began the inevitable 
process which would finally lead to Bauer’s removal from 
Bonn in March 1842. Bauer’s subjectivism animated both his 
biblical criticism and his politics. He went from 
postulating that the gospels were the product of individual 
self-consciousness to individualist criticism of the 
Prussian state and its religious policies. The state and 
orthodox Protestantism were obstacles to the progressive 
development of self-consciousness. Thus Bauer’s 
subjectivist biblical criticism spilled over into his 
politics; he unleashed his most virulent critiques when he 
feared a return of orthodox Protestant dominance. 
  Bauer’s disappointment with the new king’s policies, 
the death of the pro-Hegelian Altenstein, and the 
contentious theology faculty at Bonn may have made Bauer 
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desperate, compelling him to provocatively challenge the 
new regime, and it was his next study, the three volume 
Kritik der evangelischen Geschichte der Synoptiker, 
published between February 1841 and January 1842, that 
would ensure that Bauer would lose his position on the Bonn 
theological faculty. Bauer personally sent a manuscript to 
Eichhorn, defiantly and provocatively demonstrating his 
awareness of the implications of the publication of this 
study, and his awareness that he would soon be removed from 
the faculty at Bonn. Here, and in numerous letters to his 
brother Edgar and to Arnold Ruge between December 1840 and 
December 1842, Bauer indicated his desire to force the 
government to make a ‘final decision’ as to his position.71 
He wrote to Ruge in December 1841, suggesting to his friend 
that: 
 Since the Government does not seem to dare do anything 
 against me, it would be very good if you could find 
 ways and means to publicly accuse  me [of subversion] 
 in the Leipzig general newspaper and in the 
 Augsburger.72 
 
 Kritik der evangelischen Geschichte der Synoptiker, an 
attack on the historical veracity of the synoptic gospels, 
(Mark, Matthew, Luke) was the quintessential Young Hegelian 
expression of theology and religion. (In the 1838 Kritik 
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der evangelischen Geschichte des Johannes, Bauer had, 
following Strauss, already concluded that independent of 
the synoptic gospels, John was a literary production with 
no historical veracity.) Bauer’s Critique may be viewed 
within the context of a series of texts which appeared in 
the 19th century in search of the historical Jesus (cf. 
Strauss’ Das Leben Jesu, as well as Ludwig Feuerbach’s Das 
Wesen des Christentums, and Ernst Renan’s Jésus). It was in 
this multi-volume work that Bauer finally articulated the 
idea that the gospels were human creations, creative 
literary works rather than inspired by God. In this series 
of works, Bauer claimed (against Strauss) that the Jewish 
and Gentile Christian communities of the first centuries 
A.D. had no messianic expectations — that these 
expectations were retrospective; that is they were 
projected onto the early Christian community and merely 
attributed to the Jews and early Christian communities by 
the later church. As the gospels were reflective works, 
products of their individual authors’ self-consciousnesses, 
written after Jesus’s death, they would reflect the 
interests and objectives of the early Christian sects to 
which their authors belonged. 
 Bauer’s conclusion, which denied the continuity 
between Jewish messianic expectations and the Christian 
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fulfillment of those expectations in the person of Christ, 
further severed the continuity between the faiths — a 
campaign of severance which Bauer had began in his 1838 Die 
Religion des alten Testaments. Bauer’s assessment of the 
production of the gospels introduced an element of 
subjectivity into the gospels, and equated God with man (an 
equation made by so many other Young Hegelians.) In this 
case, the ‘word of God’ encapsulated in the gospels was 
nothing more than the word of man.73 The Gospel of Mark (the 
‘proto-gospel’ upon which the others had relied — the 
existence of a Q gospel had not yet been postulated) was 
nothing but an artistic creation which expressed its 
author’s philosophical point of view, upon which the others 
were based.74 Bauer compared the evangelists to Homer and 
Hesiod, whom Herodotus had claimed invented the Greek gods; 
similarly, the evangelists had invented the Jesus narrative 
and consequently, the Christian religion.75 In the third 
volume of the Kritik, Bauer claimed: 
 Everything that constitutes the historical Christ, 
 what is said of him, what we know of him, belongs to 
 the world of representation, more particularly of 
 Christian representation. But this information has 
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 absolutely nothing to do with a person who belongs to 
 the real world.76 
 
Thus the Christ legend had been ‘invented’ by the 
evangelists, rather than stemming from the Jewish or early 
Christian expectations of a Messiah. Thus the gospels were 
reflective works, intended by their authors to buttress the 
already existing Christian traditions of the authors’ 
sects. The gospel narratives included characteristics of 
the personalities of their respective authors, not any 
revealed truths.  
 Another challenge to orthodox Hegelianism which 
Bauer’s biblical criticism offered concerned the meaning of 
the person of Jesus. For Hegel and his orthodox followers, 
the essence of God and man (or universal and particular) 
found unity, and was identical, in the person of Jesus. 
According to Bauer (as well as Strauss and Feuerbach), the 
joining of God and man, universal and particular, did not 
occur in just one person (Jesus), but rather occurred 
universally, and this union of divine and corporeal was an 
object to be realized by all humanity (though experienced 
individually) as the dialectic of history unfolded. This 
interpretation represents a humanistic understating of the 
person and life of Jesus. According to Bauer, the state and 
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its citizens could participate in the realization of this 
end, this goal of the union of universal and particular, 
but for Bauer, Frederick William IV and his policies 
represented an historical regression and presented an 
obstacle to the dialectical development of self-
consciousness towards its union with God and its freedom. 
According to Bauer, the state (read: the reactionary 
Prussian state of Frederick William IV), “[I]s not the work 
of freedom, its lack of freedom and its imperfection is its 
dependence upon the Church . . . ”77 
 In this way, Bauer denied both the historicity and 
divinity of Jesus. Strauss, a political conservative 
despite his theologically subversive ideas, did not believe 
his criticism threatened the Christian faith, nor did he 
wish to upset it (at least in the 1830s). Bauer, in the 
final volume of his Kritik, sought precisely this — to 
destroy the historical basis of Christianity and in turn 
the whole Christian religion with it. For the Bauer of the 
first two Kritiken, the Christian religion was an essential 
component in the dialectical development of self-
consciousness, but one that now caused alienation, and was 
to be transcended. Revealed religion, or traditional 
Christianity, was nothing more than self-alienated Spirit. 
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The religious mind could only liberate itself from the 
fetters of its own religious beliefs by coming to 
consciousness of the fact that God was nothing more than a 
product of itself, and not immanent in the world. The Bauer 
of the third Kritik (Jan. 1842) however, frustrated and 
fully aware that his academic tenure was in jeopardy, took 
a more hostile tone. It was here where Bauer denied the 
historical existence of Jesus. 
  Bauer’s Kritik der evangelischen Geschichte der 
Synoptiker established his Young Hegelian bona fides, but 
also enraged the Bonn theological faculty and convinced 
Eichhorn that something had to be done with Bauer. In 
August 1841, after the publication of the first two volumes 
of Bauer’s Kritik, Eichhorn appealed to the theology 
faculties at the six Prussian universities to help decide 
whether Bauer was a Christian and whether he should be 
allowed to teach. Their answers were not uniform, but Bonn 
argued the most forcefully for Bauer’s removal.78 By the 
time of Eichhorn’s appeal to the theology faculties of 
Prussia, Bauer was unquestionably aware that his position 
at Bonn was not secure, even before his official removal in 
March 1842. Bauer’s participation in a tribute to the 
liberal jurist and publicist Karl Welcker (1790-1869) in 
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December 1841 did not help his cause, for this too caused 
consternation with Eichhorn and Frederick William IV. The 
king, outraged that an academic employed by the state in 
one of its universities would participate in a tribute to 
Welcker, instructed Eichhorn to see to it that “Doctor 
Bauer never again return to Bonn in his role as privat 
docent.79 The king’s instructions were executed in March 
1842, as Bauer was formally notified of his removal from 
Bonn. Almost immediately prior to Bauer’s dismissal, he had 
written Arnold Ruge and affirmed: “I will not be satisfied 
until I have blown all the theological faculties sky 
high.”80 
 Though ostensibly resigned to his removal from Bonn, 
Bauer was outraged, and many intellectuals across Germany 
shared his outrage. A contemporary, Ludwig Pietsch 
proclaimed that Bauer’s dismissal “had the whole of 
cultivated Germany in the most violent excitement.”81 Other 
German intellectuals could no doubt identify with Bauer’s 
situation and felt threatened by the reactionary measures 
                                                        
79 “ . . . dass der Dr. Bauer nicht weider in sein Verhältnis als 
Privatdozent nach Bonn zurückkehrt.” Ersnt Barnikol, Bruno Bauer: 
Studien und Materialen, edited by Peter Reimer and Hans-Martin Sass. 
(Assen: Van Gorcum, 1972), 154. 
80 Letter from Bruno Bauer to Arnold Ruge, 1 March 1842. Cited from 
Toews, Hegelianism, 318. 
81 Ludwig Pietsch, Wie ich Schriftsteller geworden bin (Berlin: 1893), 
251. Cited from Hellman, Berlin, 83. 
 62
the new king was taking, and by the strength of the Pietist 
faction in the new Prussian court.82 
Bauer’s official removal from Bonn in 1842 was not the 
only act of political repression that year. Ruge’s Deutsche 
Jahrbücher and Marx’s Rheinische Zeitung, both journals to 
which Bauer contributed articles, were shut down by the 
Prussian government.83 The same year saw the government of 
Frederick William IV remove nearly all Hegelians from their 
academic and civic posts, contributing to the unrest 
already caused by Bauer’s removal and the suppression of 
Ruge and Marx’s journals.84 
 From his new position outside of official Prussian 
university life Bauer had radical license, and he wasted no 
time in exploiting it.  In 1842, in immediate response to his 
dismissal from Bonn, Bauer wrote Die gute Sache der 
Freiheit und meine eigene Angelenheit, where he publicly 
admitted to being an atheist, and argued that atheism was 
the only philosophical position that could free man from 
the yoke of religion. In it, Bauer suggested (as Feuerbach 
had in the 1841 Das Wesen des Christentums) that religion 
was a form of alienation, and an obstacle to human 
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freedom.85 Die gute Sache was published in Zürich, beyond 
the reach of the Prussian censors. By the time of its 
publication, Bauer’s attack on Christianity had grown so 
provocative that he found it difficult to convince his 
publishers (including Otto Wigand and Ruge) to print his 
radical work, for fear of government recrimination.86 
Radical agitators such as Bauer knew the consequences 
of their theological and political subversion. If removed 
from their academic positions there was little chance of 
finding reemployment, at once because the Karlsbad Decrees 
forbade a professor dismissed from his position to teach 
again in any Prussian university, and because of the 
surplus of professional (theological and legal) men in mid 
nineteenth-century German universities. Some of the 
bitterness Bauer felt over his removal was no doubt a 
result of his realization that he would now find little 
prospect of secure, consistent employment.  
Additionally, upon his removal Bauer was from now on 
denied the prestige of state service. Academic appointments 
carried with them a certain status, and personal ties and 
friendships were often cemented by membership in academic 
society. Being removed from one’s academic position might 
be compared to being excommunicated by the medieval church 
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— one was not only excluded from one sphere of life (the 
university or the church), but rather socially ostracized 
from nearly all of society as well. 
The problem of a surplus of educated men and the 
consequences of such a surplus would have been particularly 
acute in Bauer’s case, for the largest percentage of 
students during Bauer’s time at university were enrolled in 
theology, 38.5 percent.87 The result was more theologians 
than the job market could absorb. This was true of the 
legal profession as well, and Bauer’s friend Arnold Ruge 
was similarly affected by this trend.88 
Along with the embitterment felt as a result of their 
removal, the generation of The Free saw little prospect for 
(re)employment in official academic life due to the lack of 
openings in official academic and bureaucratic positions 
during this period. By the early 1830s, more graduates in 
theology (and law) were entering the job market than could 
be absorbed by the bureaucracy (including the universities) 
and the churches.89 Many of those excluded in previous 
periods found reemployment. Humboldt devoted the rest of 
his life to private study and scholarship, with great 
success, as did a number of the Göttingen Seven. Some even 
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entered politics as representatives of assemblies. This 
would have been clearly impossible for a figure such as 
Stirner, who advocated the annihilation of the state. 
The unemployment crisis and subsequent downturn in the 
economy, as well as the lack of jobs in the ‘official’ 
sector contributed to a climate of discontent among 
intellectuals who could not find a ‘place’ in Prussian 
academic, religious, or civic society. The bureaucracy 
became more diligent in their work of policing dissident 
activity, and those turned away from civic employment were 
disaffected and no doubt more receptive to ideas critical 
of the government. This climate of intellectual discontent 
and uneasiness was perfectly suited for the creation of 
radical groups, and was the one in which The Free formed, 
and which Bauer was radicalized. 
 Bauer left for Berlin shortly after his dismissal from 
Bonn, bitter and vengeful that the government had actually 
carried out his removal.90 It was during this time that 
Bauer began attending meetings of Die Freien at Hippel’s 
Weinstube. This group of beer-hall literati promulgated 
their radical theology and politics in such journals as the 
Norddeutsche Blätter für Kritik, Literatur und 
Unterhaltung, and the Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung, edited 
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by Bruno and Edgar Bauer. To be sure, Bauer was familiar 
with some of the figures who would later make up, or be 
associated with, The Free, but 1842, after his dismissal 
from Bonn, represents the period when he first attended 
meetings of the group. The Free announced their formal 
existence in 1842 as an act of radical solidarity in 
reaction to Bauer’s removal from Bonn.91 But the group’s 
origins may be traced back even further, to the Doktorklub, 
the group founded in 1837 at the University of Berlin for 
the discussion of Young Hegelian ideas. In addition to The 
Free’s meetings at Hippel’s Weinstube, the salon of Bettina 
von Arnim, which he began to frequent at the same time, 
provided Bauer with another radical outlet of expression.92 
The roster of Die Freien was not fixed, but regular 
attendees of the group’s meetings included Marx, Engels, 
Bauer’s brothers Edgar and Egbert, Ludwig Buhl, Eduard 
Meyen, and Max Stirner. Edgar wrote defenses of Bruno 
against his brother’s critics, attacking the tepid 
political commitments of liberals not willing to join The 
Free. Buhl, a bohemian scribbler, along with the literary 
critic Meyen, popularized the ideas of The Free in 
mainstream journalism.93 Stirner, a close friend of Bauer’s 
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and later a critic, was a nihilist philosopher who rejected 
all philosophical abstraction and advocated the destruction 
of the state and all forms of authority. It was in this 
group of rowdy intellectuals that strong personalities 
clashed, radical contacts could be made, publishers could 
be found for subversive texts, and editors could be found 
for radical journals. 
Yet another figure who frequented the meetings of The 
Free — and whose career and intellectual development was 
similar to Bauer’s — was the lawyer and publisher Arnold 
Ruge. Ruge, a close friend of Bauer’s — began his career as 
a Hegelian, but as the minister Altenstein’s promises to 
support critical Hegelianism fell short of Ruge’s 
expectations, and as Pietists, reactionary figures such as 
Stahl, and anti-Hegelians such as Schelling gained power in 
Prussian universities, and as Ruge’s petitions for tenure 
at Halle University were consistently denied, he turned to 
the far Left and became a fervent critic of the existing 
state.94 The careers of Ruge, as well as so many of The 
Free, were similarly affected by the accession of Frederick 
William IV to the throne in 1840, their dismissals from 
academic posts for subversive ideas and the resulting 
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bitterness and inability to secure stable reemployment, and 
their patronage of radical political journals and clubs.  
Bruno Bauer and The Free’s acerbic attacks on morals 
and orthodox religion and politics would have been 
unthinkable outside of the context of the rowdy environment 
of the radical Berlin clubs and saloons.95 The Berlin cafes 
such as Hippel’s where The Free met served as “a kind of 
compensatory political forum” supplying radical journals 
and news not available from local mainstream media.96 The 
goal of the Young Hegelians was to demonstrate that 
theology was merely a human endeavor — to replace 
transcendental theology with humanist philosophy. In the 
case of Bruno Bauer, this was carried out through source 
criticism of the gospels. The Free did not take their 
radical endeavor lightly. In time, they would develop a 
reputation for being the wildest atheists in Germany, 
iconoclasts devoid of any semblance of humanity.97  
A figure upon whom The Free relied heavily for 
assisting them in the dissemination of their radical ideas 
was the Leipzig publisher Otto Wigand. Wigand was a radical 
publisher who was associated with The Free, and attended 
several of their meetings. In addition to publishing Ruge’s 
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Hallische Jahrbücher für deutsche Wissenschaft und Kunst, 
Wigand also published Feuerbach’s Das Wesen Des 
Christentums in 1841. Furthermore, Wigand published the 
first edition (which consisted of one thousand copies) of 
Stirner’s Der Einzige und sein Eigentum, losing only 250 to 
the censors.98 While there is no evidence that Wigand 
contributed to The Free intellectually, his function as 
publisher of their texts and journals was indispensable to 
the group. Few publishers were willing to risk themselves 
as consistently as Wigand did to publish The Free’s radical 
material. As publisher of their journals and books, Wigand 
provided The Free with outlets of radical expression. 
Wigand’s journals served as outlets for the radical 
publications of The Free, but other journals also 
disseminated their work. The importance of the journal for 
the dissemination of a party’s views in early nineteenth-
century Germany cannot be overstated. Groups or parties 
sharing common social and political views established their 
identity through the establishment of a journal.99 These 
journals aided the Young Hegelians in the formation of a 
common identity.100 They served as a Young Hegelian vehicle 
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for expression. Bauer’s contributions to these Young 
Hegelian organs served as “major theoretical articulations 
of [a] Left Hegelian ideology . . . ”101 The radical 
journals that Bauer contributed to not only gave license to 
his radicalism, but also served a practical purpose — they 
provided him with a source (albeit not steady or secure) of 
income outside of Prussian academic culture — just enough 
for subsistence and to finance his vitriolic attacks on the 
Prussian state. 
One such journal was the Hallische Jahrbücher. Arnold 
Ruge founded the Hallische Jahrbücher in 1837 as a 
counterweight to the Jahrbücher für wissenschaftliche 
Kritik, the main journal of the Old Hegelians, but was 
compelled to move the operation to Dresden in 1841 because 
of pressures from the censors and from conservative 
Prussian scholars such as Heinrich Leo.102 Strauss, 
Feuerbach, and even the young anarchist Mikhail Bakunin 
contributed to the Hallische Jahrbücher. The Hallische 
Jahrbücher gained immediate popularity, especially among 
Young Hegelian sympathizers in universities (both faculty 
and students) and among the so-called intellectual 
proletariat — those unemployed intellectuals who frequented 
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cafes and salons from which The Free would draw their 
ranks. With the move to Dresden in 1841, the former 
Hallische Jahrbücher became the Deutsche Jahrbücher, and 
grew even more radical in tone. Both journals were 
dedicated to proselytizing the revolutionary implications 
of Hegel’s philosophy to their readers, but the Deutsche 
Jahrbücher was openly republican and advocated atheism and 
revolution, “expressing acid criticisms of the oppressive 
bureaucracies that dominated Germany.”103 
 The Rheinische Zeitung, a journal founded in Cologne 
by Georg Jung and Robert Oppenheim, two “radical followers 
of Hegel”, as a liberal outlet of expression, was founded 
in 1842.104 Its tone grew more provocative as time 
progressed, as such Young Hegelians as Bauer, Stirner, 
Moses Hess, Feuerbach, and Marx contributed articles. The 
suppression of the moderate journal Athenaum in 1841 
provoked the ire of its contributors (the usual suspects of 
Die Freien), who like Bauer, expressed their angst as well 
as their distaste with the surrounding political and social 
events of 1840-1842 in Ruge’s Hallische Jahrbücher, and 
then the Deutsche Jahrbücher. In 1843 Prussia convinced 
Saxony to suppress the Deutsche Jahrbücher, and Ruge and 
Marx moved to Paris to begin publication of a new journal, 
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the Deutsch-französische Jahrbücher. In the same year, 
Bruno and Edgar Bauer founded a journal, the Allgemeine 
Literatur-Zeitung, for the expression of their radical 
opinions and disgust with the masses for failing to rally 
behind them as the government suppressed the radical press 
and grew increasingly reactionary. Bruno and Edgar’s 
journal served as a sort of radical counterpart/complement 
to Ruge and Marx’s Deutsch-französische Jahrbücher.  
The radicalism of journals such as the Hallische 
Jahrbücher and the Deutsche Jahrbücher was a result of the 
government’s suppression of even moderate journals, and had 
the effect of enraging its contributors, like Bauer, even 
further. The regime’s suppression of radical outlets of 
expression only increased the resolve of the wild spirits 
of The Free, and united them in their radicalism more 
tightly. It also had the effect of isolating them from any 
outside moderating influences.105 
One example of Bauer’s contributions to these radical 
journals is his Die Judenfrage. Bauer remained true to his 
atheism and his religious criticism in this 1842-1843 
article on the Jewish question by arguing that the Jews 
should not be granted political emancipation on the basis 
of their membership in a religious group — this suggested a 
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privileging of religious identification, which Bauer 
opposed. If the Jews wanted true emancipation, they would 
emancipate themselves from the fetters of their alienating, 
oppressive, religious consciousnesses, their true yoke, 
rather than agitating for political freedom. 
Bauer’s most radically hostile expression of atheism, 
Das Entdeckte Christentum appeared in 1843. Das Entdeckte 
Christentum was Bauer’s most radically hostile expression 
of atheism and anti-Christian sentiment. It is this work 
which truly established Bauer as ‘The Robespierre of 
Theology’. In it, Bauer makes his most militant attack on 
Christianity yet, confessing his hatred of religion, and 
arguing that religion causes the alienation of man from his 
nature. In a letter to the book’s publisher, Julius Fröbel, 
Bauer outlines the contents of Das Entdeckte Christentum: 
“I demonstrate that religion is a hell composed of hatred 
for humanity and that God is the bailiff of this hell . . . 
”106  
In 1844 Bauer founded the journal Allgemeine 
Literatur-Zeitung with his brother Edgar. The Allgemeine 
Literatur-Zeitung was founded primarily on political rather 
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than theological issues. It included articles dealing with 
poverty in Berlin, different varieties of socialism, and 
even debated the merits of the English Corn Laws.107 It 
folded after less than a year, and along with it Bauer’s 
involvement with the Berlin Young Hegelians.108 At the same 
time The Free began to dissolve, and the ‘new’ Young 
Hegelians arrived on the scene (Marx, Engels, Bakunin), 
uninterested in Bauer’s ‘Terrorismus der wahren Theorie’, 
but rather with practical action.  
By the late 1840s and 1850s, the volume of Bauer’s 
once prolific literary output diminished. He continued to 
publish histories and biblical source-criticism, but his 
later works were less well received and he never enjoyed 
the reputation as the intellectual luminary he once held. 
Even in his later works, Bauer indicated his continuing 
bitterness over the accession of Frederick William IV, and 
how much the events of the early 1840s affected his 
intellectual development. One such work was Vollständige 
Geschichte der Parteikämpfe in Deutschland während der 
Jahre 1842-1846 (1842-1846) where Bauer chronicled the 
disappointment felt by intellectuals who had placed their 
hopes in Frederick William IV for a more democratic and 
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liberal Prussia. It also lamented the increasing power of 
the church and state during the early 1840s.  
From 1855 to 1856 Bauer visited London, where on 
occasion he was received by Marx.109 After the break-up of 
The Free and the Revolutions of 1848 Bauer turned to 
writing secular history and outrageous biblical criticism 
where he claimed Philo and Seneca were the true authors of 
the Gospels. What he did write during this period was 
largely ignored, and lacked the critical spirit of his 
previous works. During his later career, Bauer was reduced 
to doing editorial work for the reactionary editor Hermann 
Wagener. In 1866 he stopped his work for Wagener and took 
up farming in a Berlin suburb to provide for his orphaned 
nieces. He continued on in this way until April 1882 when 
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5. The Direction of Prussian Radicalism after 1840 
It was only after 1840 that true, sustained, political 
radicalism could arise in Prussia. After the disappointment 
felt as a result of Frederick William IV’s broken promises 
of reform, a wider audience emerged which was receptive to 
criticism of the state, and thus began the socio-political 
basis of radicalization. Frederick William III had 
effectively played the forces of reform and reaction off of 
each other, but in 1842, after the short conciliatory 
period of his reign was over, Frederick William IV “leaned 
too far in the direction of the reactionary parties”111, and 
the forces of loyal opposition and reform were radicalized. 
Despite the king’s relaxation of censorship and the 
granting of amnesty for political prisoners in the first 
two years of his reign, theological dissidents such as 
Bauer saw his Pietism, Romanticism, and religious policies 
as a threat from the beginning. Though the king enacted 
some liberal political reforms from June 1840 to 1842, he 
did not relent in his strong (and according to Bauer, 
regressive) Pietistic religious beliefs.112  
Additionally, the cumulative effects of the liberals’ 
agitation for reform were finally beginning to find 
resonance. The economic dislocation and resulting social 
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unrest during the 1840s contributed to creating a wider, 
more receptive audience for subversive ideas.113 James J. 
Sheehan has found that after 1840 the German press “became 
more politically engaged”, and new, increasingly subversive 
journals and pamphlets appeared with greater regularity.114 
David Blackbourn has noted that political opposition was 
increasingly radicalized after 1840, and that “the pace of 
political debate picked up and public opinion grew 
bolder.”115 Indeed, by 1842, one found it impossible “not to 
become identified with a . . . political party.”116 
Before the accession of Frederick William IV in June 
1840, and the implementation of his reactionary and 
Pietistic policies, Bauer had hoped that the state would 
contribute to development of self-consciousness. Bauer’s 
disillusionment with Frederick’s policies served to 
radicalize his thought, though failed to foster in him a 
commitment to practical political action.  
Bauer’s 1841 contention that the state could no longer 
serve as a vehicle for the development of self-
consciousness illuminates a turning point in Prussian 
radicalism. Radical intellectuals gave up on their belief 
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that the state could contribute to the progress of freedom 
and recognition (two tried and true Hegelian goals of 
historical development) and began instead attacking the 
state itself.  
Bauer’s political radicalism, to perpetuate a Marxist 
bromide, was theoretical rather than practical, but so was 
Marx’s early political criticism. Thus, Bauer’s political 
radicalization points to the direction of Prussian 
radicalism after 1840. Theology was not out of the picture 
— its influence did persist in Prussia after 1840 — but 
political criticism became paramount, especially because 
the state would not reform its religious policies.  Before 
1840, religion was considered an obstacle to the 
development and freedom of self-consciousness. After 1840, 
the state (and to an extent, the market) was recognized as 
the primary impediment to the subject’s realization of 
freedom. Theology became a function of politics rather than 
vice versa. This can be seen in Marx’s contention that 
religion would disappear along with the state; that one 
does not need to eliminate religion to empower the 
revolution, but rather with revolution, religion will 
wither away.  
The figure of Marx may serve as an indication that 
that period of disillusionment over the broke promises of 
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Frederick William IV was coming to an end, as intellectuals 
began to recognize that they and the revolutionary classes 
rather than the state could carry the revolution. Marx 
might represent the turning point from Hegelianism and 
theory to political radicalism — a practical and economic 
turn that Bauer and those he identified as prisoners of a 
religious consciousness never made. 
Besides illuminating how the accession of Frederick 
William IV served as a turning point for so many Prussian 
intellectuals, and how intellectuals were marginalized by 
official Prussian society and thus radicalized, the career 
of Bruno Bauer reveals the political choices German 
intellectuals were compelled to make in their roles as 
civic employees of the state. Figures such as Bauer and 
Ruge chose not to support the regime of Frederick William 
IV and were thus excluded from Prussian academic society 
and the benefits and prestige that came with membership in 
that society.  
Not only outspoken critics of the state were 
marginalized by the Prussian government in the 1840s, but a 
long roster of Left Hegelians, whom Frederick and Eichhorn 
hoped to eradicate from Prussian academic life, were denied 
the privileges afforded to those scholars who actively 
supported the regime. For example, Feuerbach, Strauss, 
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Ruge, and Bauer were all Left Hegelians either removed from 
their academic positions, or while in academia were not 
offered ‘tenure’ positions, such as Bauer, who was 
consigned to be an unsalaried lecturer — a privatdozent —
and then expelled. 
On the other hand, Center and Right (Old) Hegelians, 
who chose to support the state and argued that reason 
should conform itself to existing social reality (i.e., 
whichever Prussian monarch was currently in power), kept 
their academic appointments, which were all at least on the 
associate professorial level. Right Hegelians such as K. 
Rosenkranz, E. Gans, G. Gabler, and Marheineke were all 
full professors in 1840.117 Their support for the regime was 
rewarded by maintaining their academic appointments and 
salaries, to say nothing of their status. Bauer and the 
members of Die Freien, on the other hand, were dismissed 
from academic life. Thus, one’s political and philosophical 
proclivities within the Hegelian school roughly 
corresponded to their academic status, which often mirrored 
the conflicts within German society as whole during this 
time.118 
Prussian intellectuals of the 1840s were forced to 
make a political choice, a choice that could affect their 
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career positively or negatively. In the case of Bruno Bauer 
and so many Young Hegelian intellectuals, their decision to 
stand in opposition to the reactionary, Pietistic policies 
of Frederick William IV, left them on the margins of 






















Bruno Bauer’s investigations into the person of Jesus 
and the composition of Gospels became increasingly radical 
as time progressed.119 For Bauer, as for so many young 
intellectuals of the nineteenth century, biblical source 
criticism, the relentless quest of the truth of the 
historical Jesus, and the bitter atheism which some such 
pursuits precipitated, represented, according to Nietzsche,  
the awe-inspiring catastrophe of a two-thousand-year 
 discipline in truth-telling, which finally forbids 
 itself the lie involved in belief in God.120 
 
Along with the crisis of faith engendered by those 
investigations, Bauer’s intellectual development from 
orthodoxy to atheism was shaped by the ascendancy of a 
reactionary Pietistic king to the throne in June 1840, the 
climate of intellectual repression in the 1840s, Bauer’s 
removal from his position at the University of Bonn in 
1842, and his patronage of radical political journals and 
clubs. His career and intellectual development may serve as 
an example of the choices early nineteenth-century German 
intellectuals were forced to make during their careers — to 
support or criticize the existing regime — and the 
consequences those choices held for the remainder of their 
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lives. It also serves to illuminate the inextricable 
relationship between theology and politics in Vormärz 
Prussia, and how Prussian radicalism, long after French 
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